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NOTES
In re Kapoor: Life Insurance, Divorce, and Inheritance Tax
In In re Kapoor, a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina construed the term "debts of decedent" as it is used in
N.C. Gen. Stat. section 105-9(4).2 The court held that a separation
agreement between a decedent and his first wife, which required the
decedent to maintain life insurance policies, the proceeds of which
would be used to establish a trust fund for the benefit of his ex-wife and
their children, created a valid contractual obligation. Therefore, the
policy proceeds could be deducted from the value of the taxable estate
for inheritance tax purposes as a "debt of the decedent."
The testamentary trust funded by the proceeds of life insurance poli-
cies has gained considerable use in divorce and separation agreements
because of its relatively low immediate cost compared to the large
payoff when the insured dies. In holding that the proceeds of such poli-
cies used to establish a trust fund for the benefit of children pursuant to
a separation agreement were deductible from a decedent husband's tax-
able estate, and in defining the criteria that must be met to qualify for
the deduction, In re Kapoor allows substantial inheritance tax advan-
tages when such a device is used.'
The approach taken by the North Carolina Supreme Court in deter-
mining the inheritance tax consequences of the terms of a separation
agreement differs markedly from that taken by the courts that follow
1. 303 N.C. 102, 277 S.E.2d 403 (1981).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-9 (1979) provides:
In determining the clear market value of property taxed under this Article, or schedule, the
following deductions, and no others, shall be allowed: (i) Taxes accrued and unpaid at the
death of the decedent and unpaid ad valorem taxes accruing during the calendar year of
death .... (4) Debts of decedent, (5) Estate and inheritance taxes paid to other states, and
death duties paid to foreign countries.
Deductions are also allowed for drainage and street assessments, funeral and burial expenses, the
cost of a monument, commissions of executors and administrators actually paid, and costs of
administration of the estate. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-9(2), (3), (6)-(8) (1979).
3. The possible income tax liability on the proceeds is a complex and unresolved question
which is beyond the scope of this casenote. Generally the proceeds of a life insurance policy paid
by reason of the death of the insured are not taxable as income. But if the proceeds are being paid
to a divorced spouse as alimony or through an alimony trust they are considered income to the
recipient. Payments for child support are not considered income. If the use of payments is not
delineated as such the court will decide what percentage is for child support and tax the remainder
as alimony. If the policy was transferred for valuable consideration, for example the surrender of
marital rights, the proceeds would be excludable up to the value of those rights, but any excess
could be considered income. See generaly 59 A.L.R.3d 9 (1974).
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the Internal Revenue Code in construing state tax statutes. The I.R.C.
applies special rules when evaluating the terms of a separation agree-
ment.' Justice Carlton, however, writing for the court in In re Kapoor,
examined the separation agreement in question as he would have ex-
amined any contract. As will be shown, this difference in approach
could have the effect of allowing tax deductions in North Carolina
under certain circumstances where deductions would not be allowed
for federal estate tax purposes.
The importance of minimizing the burden of state inheritance taxes
has been increased by the changes made in the federal estate tax rules
in the Economic Recovery Act of 198 1.1 Under the old law the federal
estate tax burden was invariably much higher than that imposed by the
state. Under the new federal estate tax rules, however, many estates
will have to pay no federal taxes at all.6 Consequently, any state taxes
that can be avoided will directly benefit the taxpayer.
When Dr. Shankar N. Kapoor died he was survived by his second
wife, Nancy N. Kapoor, his former wife, Ruth Kapoor, and two chil-
dren by his first marriage, Karl and Pamela Kapoor. Prior to their di-
vorce, he and his first wife executed a separation agreement that
provided for the support and maintenance of his former wife and chil-
dren during his lifetime and for the establishment of a trust funded by
the proceeds of life insurance policies to continue the support payments
after his death. The terms of the separation agreement obligated Dr.
Kapoor to "maintain in full force and effect. . . a life insurance trust
in the amount of at least $150,000 for the benefit of Ruth Kapoor
and/or their children . . . . Dr. Kapoor agrees to make timely pay-
ment of all premiums due on the policies placed in the trust."7
Dr. Kapoor fulfilled his obligations, and at his death the trustee, Wa-
chovia Bank & Trust Co., collected the policy proceeds, $151,754.63.
Because Dr. Kapoor had retained certain incidents of ownership in the
policies, the executor of his estate included the policy proceeds in the
gross estate when he filed the estate and inheritance tax returns with the
United States Internal Revenue Service and the North Carolina De-
partment of Revenue.'
The executor then requested a refund of that part of the taxes paid
on the insurance proceeds, claiming that the insurance proceeds were
4. See infra text accompanying notes 43-62.
5. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). Perhaps the most significant changes are the
increase in the unified transfer tax credit, I.R.C. § 2010 (1982), which will exempt the first
$600,000 transferred when the Act is fully implemented in 1987, and the provision for an unlim-
ited marital deduction, id § 2207(A), effective January 1, 1981.
6. "When the (Economic Recovery Tax) Act is fully implemented in 1987, less than 0.5% of
all estates are expected to be subject to tax." BACHE HALSEY STUART SHIELDS, INC., THE TAX
ACT-WHAT IT MEANS TO THE INDIVIDUAL 18 (1981).
7. 303 N.C. at 107, 277 S.E.2d at 408.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 64-69.
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deductible from the gross estate under the Internal Revenue Code sec-
tion 2053(a)(3)-(4) 9 and N.C. Gen. Stat. section 105-9(4). The Internal
Revenue Service allowed the claim for refund, but the requested refund
from the North Carolina Department of Revenue was denied.' 0
The executor requested a hearing on the denial before the Secretary
of Revenue, " who also denied the claim for refund. The executor then
filed for review by the Tax Review Board,' 2 which affirmed the deci-
sion of the Secretary of Revenue. 13 The executor then petitioned for
judicial review.14 Judge Hamilton H. Hobgood of the Superior Court,
Wake County reversed the decision of the review board and ordered
the Department of Revenue to refund $14,510.58, the amount of tax
paid on the insurance proceeds, plus interest to the petitioner.
The Secretary of Revenue appealed that decision and the court of
appeals reversed the superior court.' 5 In denying the request for re-
fund the court of appeals reasoned:
The generally accepted meaning of 'debt' is 'something owed' from one
person to another... what decedent owed under the pertinent provi-
sion of the separation agreement was a 'life insurance trust in the
amount of at least $150,000' maintained in full force and effect, and this
obligation was fulfilled by the payment of the necessary life insurance
premiums. At the time of decedent's death no debt existed with respect
to this obligation. . . Since decedent had totally satisfied his contrac-
tual obligation, no debt existed and no deduction under G.S. § 105-9(4)
is proper.' 6
The Supreme Court of North Carolina allowed the executor's peti-
tion for discretionary review and reversed the decision of the court of
appeals. The court held that the $150,000 insurance proceeds required
to fund the trust was a "debt of the decedent" for purposes of an inheri-
tance tax deduction, that being the obligation intended by the parties,
9. I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3)-(4) (1982) provides:
(a) General Rule--for purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the taxa-
ble estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate such amounts--
(3) for claims against the estate, and (4) for unpaid mortgages on, or any indebtedness in
respect of, property where the value of the decedent's interest therein, undiminished by such
mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate.
10. 303 N.C. at 104, 277 S.E.2d at 405-406.
11. A hearing on the denial of a claim for refund may be requested pursuant to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-266.1 (1979). The procedures governing such a hearing are outlined in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-241.1 (1979).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-241.2 (1979) provides for review of a decision of the Secretary of
Revenue by the Tax Review Board.
13. N.C. Tax Review Board Administrative Decision No. 152 (June 21, 1978).
14. "The Administrative Procedure Act allows judicial review of a final agency decision in a
contested case when all relevant administrative remedies have been exhausted and there is no
adequate judicial review provided under any other statute." 303 N.C. at 104, 277 S.E.2d at 406
(citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1978)).
15. In re Estate of Kapoor, 47 NC. App. 500, 267 S.E.2d 418 (1980).
16. Id at 501, 267 S.E.2d at 419.
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validly contracted for and supported by consideration.' 7 To reach its
conclusion the court used a three-step analysis. First the court defined
the term "debts of the decedent" as it was used in the statute, then the
court examined the facts of the case to determine what the decedent's
true debt was under the separation agreement, and finally the court
decided if that debt had been validly contracted for.
Special rules of construction apply when a statute concerning taxa-
tion is construed. If an ambiguous term appears in a statute that pro-
vides for taxation, the term is construed against the state in favor of the
taxpayer.'I "But when the statute provides for an exemption from taxa-
tion a contrary rule applies and any ambiguities are resolved in favor
of taxation."' 9
In light of these canons of construction the Secretary of Revenue
contended that because N.C. Gen. Stat. section 105-9 defines the deduc-
tions allowed in determining the value of the property subject to inheri-
tance taxes, the term "debts of the decedent" should be "construed
narrowly and technically to include only those obligations of the dece-
dent which were due and owing prior to his death and as to which the
person to whom the obligation was owed could have maintained a
suit.20 This reasoning formed the basis of the court of appeals decision.
Justice Carlton acknowledged the existence of the special canons of
construction used in construing tax statutes. He also remarked that he
would consider the construction placed upon a tax statute by the Com-
missioner of Revenue but that he would not be bound by it. He stated,
"Our primary task in interpreting a tax statute, as with all other stat-
utes, is to ascertain and adhere to the intent of the legislature. The
cardinal principle of statutory construction is that the intent of the leg-
islature is controlling."' 2' He repeated this point in answering the con-
tention of the petitioner that the definition of "debts of the decedent" in
the North Carolina statute should be the same as that of "claims
against the estate" as used in the corresponding statute dealing with
deductions allowable in computing the value of the taxable estate for
federal estate tax purposes.22
While the federal provisions provide some guidance, absent a clear in-
dication of legislative intent to parallel federal law by use of identical
language or otherwise, we cannot accept federal law as controlling. In-
stead, we will look to 'the language of the statute, the spirit of the act,
17. 303 N.C. at 111, 277 S.E.2d at 409-10.
18. Id at 106, 277 S.E.2d at 407.
19. Id (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
20. Id
21. Id (citations omitted).
22. I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3)-(4) (1982).
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and what the act seeks to accomplish.'23
Long before the court decided In re Kapoor the Attorney General
had offered several opinions as to what obligations would constitute
allowable deductions under section 105-9(4). These three opinions are
consistent with the interpretation the court gave to the term "debts of
the decedent," and illustrative of other "debts."
In one opinion the decedent was a tenant by the entirety in real prop-
erty subject to a mortgage. The value of his interest in the real property
was included in the N.C. Inheritance Tax Return and a corresponding
deduction was allowed under section 105-9(4) equal to the
indebtedness.2
4
In another, the decedent was indebted to a financial institution which
indebtedness was secured by a life insurance policy. While the pro-
ceeds of the insurance were includible in the N.C. Inheritance Tax Re-
turn, a corresponding deduction was allowed under section § 105-9(4)
equal to the indebtedness.25
The situation in a third opinion was that the decedent had devised
property to her stepson in payment for support that the stepson had
furnished her during his lifetime. The Attorney General said that if the
claim of the stepson for which the devise was made was based on a
contract or agreement, such as would make the claim legally enforcea-
ble, the estate would be entitled to a deduction.26
Another example of a "debt of the decedent" that has been ruled an
allowable deduction in other states under provisions very similar to
section 105-9(4) is a contract in which the decedent agrees to make a
specific bequest in his will to someone in exchange for valuable consid-
eration." In In re Greiner's Estate,28 an Illinois case, as part of divorce
proceedings Lucille and Clarence Greiner made a settlement of their
respective property and support right wherein Clarence agreed to, inter
alia, pay $1,500 per month alimony and to execute a will irrevocably
bequeathing Lucille $50,000 providing that she survived him and had
not remarried at his death. After Clarence died, the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that Lucille had taken the legacy not by virtue of Clar-
ence's will but by virtue of the contract, which was supported by con-
23. 303 N.C. at 107-08, 277 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C.
300, 303, 188 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1972)).
24. 26 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 115 (July 24, 1940).
25. 27 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 176 (Oct. 8, 1943).
26. 32 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 439 (June 12, 1954).
27. See generally 59 A.L.R. 3d 969 (1974). The note points out that in states that have estate
taxes based on the right to transfer property at death, this type of deduction will never be allowed.
It is only in states that have inheritance taxes like North Carolina's, based on the right to succeed
to the decedent's property, that it would make a difference whether the bequest was made to
satisfy a contractual obligation or for some other reason.
28. 412 Ill. 591, 107 N.E.2d 836 (1952).
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sideration. The court held that the effect of the court's order was to
decree a debt against the estate and that the will was merely the means
chosen to comply with the degree and satisfy the debt. Therefore, Lu-
cille took the $50,000 as a creditor of the estate and not under the laws
of succession and the legacy was thus deductible as a debt of the
decedent.
After studying the North Carolina inheritance tax laws Justice Carl-
ton concluded that "the Legislature intended that the value of the gross
estate be reduced by the amount of the obligations associated with the
property included therein. 29
The effect of this conclusion is to give the term "debts of the dece-
dent" a very broad construction, making it equivalent to obligations
associated with the property included in the value of the gross estate, in
addition to the obvious personal debts that the decedent owed at the
time of his death. This definition clearly rejected the Commissioner's
suggested narrow construction, which would have limited deductible
debts to those due and owing prior to decedent's death. Although Jus-
tice Carlton also rejected the petitioner's claim that the court should be
controlled by the comparable I.R.C. sections in construing section 105-
9(4), the construction he gave to the term "debts of the decedent" en-
compassed both the claims and the indebtedness provisions of I.R.C.
section 2053.30
Having defined "debts of the decedent" the court then examined the
separation agreement to determine exactly what the decedent's true
debt was under its provisions. Paragraph 5 of the agreement provided:
5. That as part of the consideration of this agreement the Party of the
First Part Dr. Kapoor agrees to simultaneously establish, and thereafter
maintain in the amount of at least $150,000.00 for the benefit of the
Party of the Second Part and/or children. Dr. Kapoor agrees to make
timely payments of all premiums due on the policies placed in said
trust and further agrees to repay the principal and interest of all loans
against said policies within two years from the date of this agreement
from his funds or from those of his estate.3 '
The court concluded that Dr. Kapoor's "debt" under the agreement
was $150,000, reasoning: "What Mrs. Kapoor bargained for, and what
she gave up her marital rights for, was not the amount of money re-
quired to maintain the policies, but was the proceeds the policies would
yield at Dr. Kapoor's death.";32 The court went ont to say that his obli-
gation was to leave "a trust in the amount of at least $150,000; the
29. The court specifically noted that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-9(1), (2), and (5) are clearly
obligations associated with property included in the gross estate. See supra note 2.
30. See supra note 8.
31. New Brief of Appellant at 4, 303 N.C. 102, 277 S.E.2d 403.
32. 303 N.C. at 109, 277 S.E. at 408-09.
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obligation to purchase insurance and to pay the premiums was merely
the method chosen by the parties to fund the trust and to guarantee the
corpus."33
That the amount of the proceeds is the debt becomes even more clear
when a breach of the agreement by Dr. Kapoor at the time of his death
is hypothesized ... Had Dr. Kapoor failed to maintain the policies,
Mrs. Kapoor would have a claim against the estate for the full amount
of the proceeds, not just the amount of premiums unpaid and that
amount would be deductible as a debt of the decedent. -
The court's thinking parallels that of the I.R.C. expressed in Revenue
Ruling 76-11331 which held:
In a case where the divorce decree provided for the payment, upon the
decedent's death, to the decedent's former spouse of a specific sum of
money and the decedent provided funds thereof by the purchase of life
insurance . .. the payment of the required amount would be a per-
sonal obligation of the decedent and should the insurance company be
unable to meet its obligation, would be payable from the decedent's
estate ... and deductible from the gross estate under section
2053(a)(3) of the Code.36
The final step in the court's analysis was to determine if the dece-
dent's debt was a valid contractual obligation, supported by considera-
tion. The duty of a husband and father to pay alimony or child support
is generally personal and terminates at his death without creating a
charge against his estate.37 He may, however, create an obligation by
contract to make those payments, an obligation which will survive him
and create a charge against his estate, but his intention to do so must be
clearly expressed in the agreement.38
The separation agreement in this case obligated Dr. Kapoor to estab-
33. Id
34. Id
35. Rev. Rul. 76-113, 1976-1 C.B. 276.
36. Id at 277. This ruling also states:
The payment of insurance proceeds to the former spouse represents the satisfaction of an
indebtedness created in settlement of the decedent's marital obligations. Since the insurance
proceeds are includible in the decedent's estate at full value (by reason of the decedent's
reversionary interest in the policy), the obligation to pay the proceeds to the decedent's for-
mer spouse is an indebtedness against the property included in the value of the gross estate
for purposes of section 2053(a)(4) of the Code.
Id The Internal Revenue Service allowed the claim for refund filed by the executor of Dr.
Kapoor's estate based on both I.R.C. § 2053(a)(3) and (4).
37. 303 N.C. at 109, 277 S.E.2d at 409.
38. Id (citing Layton v. Layton, 263 N.C. 453, 139 S.E.2d 732 (1965)). In Layton, the guard-
ian of decedent's minor children sought to establish that a court order for support and mainte-
nance established an obligation that survived decedent's death and created a charge against his
estate. After stating the applicable rules of law, the court held that the purpose of the consent
order in issue was only to fix the amount of support and that there was no provision imposing an
obligation beyond that required by the principles of common law. 263 N.C. at 457, 139 S.E.2d at
735. See also Church v. Hancock, 261 N.C. 764, 136 S.E.2d 81 (1954).
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lish a trust in the amount of $150,000 for the benefit of his wife and
children. Article three of the trust agreement provided that so long as
Ruth Kapoor survived the grantor and remained unmarried she would
be paid the income from the trust quarterly, and any amount freed
from the principal of the trust that the trustee deemed necessary for the
support, care, and comfort of her and the children, their emergency
needs, and for the children's education. Articles four and five provided
for the payment of the income and principal to the children upon the
death or remarriage of Ruth Kapoor. Article ten provided that as long
as Ruth Kapoor lived and remained unmarried, the grantor could not
revoke or amend the Agreement and possessed no right in the insur-
ance policies on his life.39
The court held:
These documents evince an unmistakable intention to extend the obli-
gation to provide alimony and child support beyond Dr. Kapoor's
death. In exchange for Dr. Kapoor's promise to fund the trust Mrs.
Kapoor relinquished all her marital rights and all other claims against
Dr. Kapoor. The release of marital rights was valid consideration for
Dr. Kapoor's promise and a binding and enforceable contract was
thereby created.4°
It is in this final step in his analysis that Justice Carlton deviates from
the provisions of the Federal Estate Tax. I.R.C. section 2053(c)(1)(A)
says:
The deduction allowed by this section in the case of claims against the
estate, unpaid mortgages, or any indebtedness shall, when founded on a
promise or agreement, be limited to the extent that they were con-
tracted for bona fide and for an adequate consideration in money or
money's worth ....
This section raises two questions: when is a claim founded on a prom-
ise or agreement; and, what constitutes adequate consideration in
money or money's worth.
The Supreme Court answered the first question in Harris v. Commis-
sioner.4" In Harris the petitioner and her spouse entered into a separa-
tion agreement that divided their considerable assets between them.
The Nevada divorce court had specifically approved the terms of the
separation agreement and incorporated them into the divorce decree.
The court of appeals, however, agreed with the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue that the transfers of property were founded both upon the
decree and the separation agreement and therefore held that the excess
value of the property petitioner transferred to her husband over the
value of the consideration received constituted a gift to him, which was
39. Brief for Appellees at 4, In re Estate v. Kapoor, 47 N.C. App. 500, 267 S.E.2d 418 (1980).
40. 303 N.C. at 110-11, 277 S.E.2d at 409-10.
41. 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
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taxable.42 The Supreme Court reversed saying, "If 'the transfer' is ef-
fected by court decree, no 'promise or agreement' of the parties is the
operative fact."4 3
Although Harris was a gift tax case, its rationale was applied to
I.R.C. section 2053 and section 2043 in Revenue Ruling 60-1604 which
held:
In a case in which the divorce court has power to decree a settlement of
all property rights or to vary the terms of a prior settlement agreement,
and does approve the agreement, any indebtedness arising out of such
settlement is not considered to be founded upon a promise or agree-
ment but, rather, it is considered to be founded upon such court decree
and is, therefore, an allowable deduction from the gross estate in the
amount of such indebtedness. If the court does not have the power to
disregard the provisions of a previously existing property settlement
agreement, a deduction is allowable only to the extent that the transfer
does not exceed the reasonable value of the support rights of the wife. 41
An important aspect of this ruling, sometimes overlooked, is that the
divorce court must have the power under state law to vary the terms of
the prior settlement agreement. Absent this power, the incorporation
of the agreement into the divorce decree will not exempt the transfer of
property in exchange for marital rights from the close scrutiny man-
dated by I.R.C. section 2053. The importance of this provision was
emphasized by the court in Gray v. United States.46 In Gray, the pro-
ceeds of a life insurance policy on the decedent's life were paid to his
former wife pursuant to the terms of a preexisting property settlement
agreement that had been approved in their divorce decree. Under Cal-
ifornia law, the divorce court had no power to modify the terms of the
property settlement agreement, therefore, the court of appeals held that
the wife's claim against her ex-husband's estate was founded on the
agreement, not on the divorce decree and remanded the case for deter-
mination of whether the claim was founded on an agreement con-
tracted for adequate and full consideration. The court distinguished
Harris because it was decided based on Nevada law, under which the
divorce court does have the power to alter the terms of the agreement. 47
Under North Carolina law, once a court has ratified the terms of a
separation agreement that provides for a final settlement of property
rights, that agreement cannot be subsequently modified by the court
insofar as the division of property is concerned without the consent of
42. Harris v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1949).
43. 340 U.S. at 111. See also McMurtry v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1953).
44. Rev. Rul. 50-160, a960-1 C.B. 374.
45. Id at 375-76.
46. 541 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1976).
47. Id at 232.
9
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the parties.48 Thus, Gray would seem to be controlling in North Caro-
lina.49 This makes the I.R.S.'s decision to grant the full refund re-
quested by the executor of Dr. Kapoor's estate somewhat hard to
explain.
The second question raised by I.R.C. section 2053(c)(1)(A) is: What
constitutes adequate consideration in money or money's worth? The
court's statement that "the release of marital rights was valid consider-
ation for Dr. Kapoor's promise"50 raises several questions when com-
pared with I.R.C. section 2043(b):
For purposes of this chapter, a relinquishment or promised relinquish-
ment of dower or curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in lieu of
dower or curtesy, or of other marital rights in the decedent's property
or estate, shall not be considered to any extent a consideration "in
money or money's worth."
In construing this provision the I.R.S. has distinguished marital
property rights from marital support rights, the latter being a personal
legal obligation whose surrender may constitute consideration in
money or money's worth." Most courts have also seemed to require an
element of bargaining (perhaps to demonstrate the arms-length aspect
of the transaction) to find the relinquishment of marital rights to be
valid consideration. This may account for the different treatment of
antenupial agreements compared to separation agreements. In Sher-
man v. United States52 the court held that the obligations of the de-
creased husband's estate under a separation agreement were in
consideration of the wife's relinquishment of support rights and not of
her property or estate rights and thus were deductible for estate tax
purposes. But in Estate ofEllman53 the court held that post-death sup-
port rights relinquished in a prenuptial agreement were "marital
48. Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
49. The law appears to be unchanged by the Act for Equitable Distribution of Marital Prop-
erty, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1981). Subsection (d) of that statute provides that the parties to a
divorce may execute a written agreement that provides "for the distribution of the marital prop-
erty in a manner deemed by the parties to be equitable and the agreement shall be binding on the
parties." Id § 50-20 (1981) (emphasis added). While this statement is somewhat ambiguous, eq-
uitable distribution statutes of other jurisdictions usually contain a similar provision providing
that prior property settlement agreements shall be binding on the court. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT."
ch. 40, § 502(b) (Smith-Hurd 1980); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.255(11) (West 1981).
50. 303 N.C. at Ill, 277 S.E.2d at 410.
51. Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414 (superseding E.T. 19, 1946-2 C.B. 166). The Internal
Revenue Service reasons that the satisfaction of this legal obligation does not diminish the hus-
band's estate more than any other legal obligation, but that a transfer to a wife in settlement of
inheritance rights is a present transfer of what would otherwise be a major portion of the hus-
band's taxable estate at death. See generally R. STEPHENS, G. MAXWELL, & S. LIND, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, § 2043 (3d ed. 1974).
52. 462 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1972).
53. 59 T.C. 367 (1972).
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rights" proscribed by I.R.C. section 2043(b) and therefore not good
consideration and denied a deduction.
Justice Carlton did not address this question in his opinion and it is
possible that he meant that the release of any marital rights could be
regarded as adequate consideration. As Justice Reed wrote in his dis-
sent in Merrill v. Fahs
54
Whether the transferor of the sums paid for the release of dower and
other marital rights, received adequate and full consideration in money
and money's worth is a question of fact . . . . The trial court thus
found the present value of the release of the taxpayer's estate from the
wife's survivorship rights largely exceeded the amount paid by the tax-
payer and that the transactions between the parties were made in good
faith for business reasons and not an attempt to evade or avoid taxes
.... Its determination, we think, also makes clear that the husband's
estate received practical advantages of value in excess of the cost
paid.
If this is the view which has been adopted by the North Carolina
Supreme Court it would be possible under certain circumstances for a
decedent's estate to be subject to federal estate taxes while avoiding
entirely any state inheritance tax. Thus, had Merrill been decided
under North Carolina law as articulated by Justice Carlton in In re
Kapoor, the trial court's opinion would probably not have been re-
versed. While as a general rule courts will not examine the adequacy
of the consideration supporting a contract, 6 for determination of the
Federal Estate and Gift Tax consequences of a transaction, the value of
the consideration received is usually compared to the value of the con-
sideration given. Under the I.R.C. when marital rights are surrendered
in exchange for some amount of money they are first separated into
property rights and support rights. The property rights are then dis-
counted pursuant to I.R.C. section 2043(b). The support rights are val-
ued using many factors (e.g. the standard of living to be maintained,
number and ages of the children, age of the wife and her ability to
support herself, actuarial tables to project future needs, etc.) and their
present cash value is compared to the terms of the settlement unless
they have been incorporated into a divorce decree. Any excess of the
settlement amount over the value of the support rights is usually
deemed a gift which is subject to estate or gift tax.
One result of this approach has been to disallow deductions for sup-
port payments to adult "children." The courts have generally held that
54. 324 U.S. 308 (1944). The Court held that the release of marital rights in a prenuptial
agreement in exchange for the establishment of an irrevocable trust was not "adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth" and hence the husband should have paid gift taxes on
the trust he established for his wife. Id at 312-13.
55. Id at 413-15 (Reed, J., dissenting).
56. See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRAcTs § 4-3 (2d ed. 1977).
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because a parent's duty to support his children ends when they reach
their majority, any payments for the support of such children are vol-
untary and hence subject to estate or gift tax. 57
The North Carolina Supreme Court has apparently chosen to evalu-,
ate separation agreements as they would any other contract. This ap-
proach would seem to include a reluctance to evaluate the adequacy of
the considerations exchanged, creating another possible situation where
a North Carolina resident could avoid state inheritance taxes but still
be subject to federal estate or gift taxes.58
A fundamental tenet of inheritance tax law that underlies this case is
that the proceeds of a life insurance policy are includable in the gross
taxable estate, even if they are not paid into the estate, if the decedent
retained any "incident of ownership" in the policy. Following the
guidelines laid down by the court59 federal law is controlling in this
area because the North Carolina statute which provides for the taxation
of life insurance proceeds' is virtually identical to the corresponding
section of the I.R.C.6t Examples of incidents of ownership are: "the
power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to
assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the policy for a
loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of
the policy, etc."62 A reversionary interest in the policy or its proceeds,
the value of which exceeds five percent of the value of the policy, is also
defined as an incident of ownership in both I.R.C. section 2042(2) and
N.C. Gen. Stat. section 105-13(2).
By the terms of the trust agreement, Dr. Kapoor reserved the right to
diminish the trust by $50,000 if Ruth Kapoor remarried and to "exer-
cise all present and future policy privileges, receive all dividends...,
obtain advances or loans," etc., if Ruth Kapoor predeceased him.63
Had Dr. Kapoor not retained those incidents of ownership, the policy
proceeds would not have been includable in his taxable estate. The
court made an oblique reference to this in a footnote.'
57. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hartshorne, 402 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1968); Rosenthal v. Commis-
sioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953).
58. Under the recently enacted Act for Equitable Distribution of Marital Property, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1981), the court has the duty to provide for an equitable distribution of the
marital property between the parties. It seems unlikely that this Act will affect the court's ap-
proach to the inheritance tax problems which sometimes arise from property settlements accompa-
nying divorces.
59. See supra text accompanying note 22.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-13(2) (1979).
61. I.R.C. § 2042(2) (1982).
62. Treas. Reg. 20.2.42-1(c)(2) (1974).
63. New Brief of Appellant at 303 N.C. 102, 277 S.E.2d 403 (1981).
64. "We note that our decision will not have the effect of allowing a deduction in cases in
which the life insurance proceeds are not part of the property taxed under our statutes even
though there is still a 'debt of the decedent.' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-9, the sole statute providing
12
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Who must pay the estate taxes resulting from the inclusion of the
proceeds of a life insurance policy in the taxable estate? I.R.C. section
2206 provides:
Unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross
estate on which tax has been paid consists of proceeds of policies of
insurance on the life of the decedent receivable by a beneficiary other
than the executor, the executor shall be entitled to recover from such
beneficiary such portion of the total tax paid as the proceeds of such
policies bear to the taxable estate.
While there is no North Carolina statute corresponding to I.R.C. sec-
tion 2206, the common law dictates a similar result. The court of ap-
peals said in First National Bank of Shelby v. Dixon:65
Although no N.C. statute or case deals precisely with the question
before us, we are constrained by equity and the example of our federal
and sister state governments to hold that where proceeds of a life insur-
ance policy are includable in a decedent's taxable estate by reason of
G.S. § 105-13, a lien for taxes arises against the beneficiary is primarily
liable for the taxes so incurred as provided by G.S. § 105-15. There-
fore, the personal representative of an estate may proceed against the
beneficiary of such insurance policy, or may retain such assets in the
estate as would otherwise pass to the beneficiary and proceed under
G.S. § 105-18 to obtain the ratable share of tax incurred by the estate
by reason of the includable process.66
CONCLUSION
In In re Kapoor the North Carolina Supreme Court construed the
term "debts of decedent" as it is used in North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 105-9(4) to include not only the personal debts of the dece-
dent, but also obligations associated with the property in the decedent's
estate. More importantly, Justice Carlton articulated his approach to
the problem, which varies in certain key aspects from the rules used in
the I.R.C. He applied basic principles of contract law to determine
whether the "decedent's debt" under his separation agreement had
been validly contracted for, and whether he had received consideration.
Having answered those questions in the affirmative, he did not attempt
to value the consideration (decedent's ex-wife's marital rights) that the
decedent had received.
Under I.R.C. section 2043, release of marital property rights is spe-
cially defined as not being consideration in money or money's worth.
for deductions, allows a deduction which is associated with certain property only when that prop-
erty is taxed under the inheritance laws. If the insurance proceeds were not includable as property
of decedent, no deduction for indebtedness associated with those proceeds will be allowed.
303 N.C. at I11, 277 S.E.2d at 410, n.4.
65. 38 N.C. App. 430, 248 S.E.2d 416 (1978).
66. Id at 434, 248 S.E.2d at 420.
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Giving up marital support rights may be consideration such as would
support a claim against a decedent's estate that would be allowable as a
deduction under the Internal Revenue Code compared with the value
of what was received in exchange, and the difference would be taxable
as a gift.
The difference in the two approaches would seem to benefit the
North Carolina taxpayer who dies after executing a separation agree-
ment that includes a life insurance trust for the benefit of his ex-spouse
as one of its provisions. The avoidance of the close scrutiny and com-
parison of the value of the marital rights given up and the amount of
the settlement could only lessen the taxes on his estate.
EDWARD M. REISNER
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